Political sources of military defeat in post-communist ethnic conflicts

Abstract

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, serious ethnic conflicts erupted in Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Tajikistan. In these conflicts, three political factors facilitated and worsened military defeat. First, governments were sometimes unnecessarily entangled in conflicts. In some cases, such entanglement might have been avoided or minimized by making early autonomy concessions to ethnic minorities. Once wars were underway, entanglement could sometimes be minimized by agreeing to ceasefires, rather than by risking premature efforts at a military solution. Second, post-communist countries did not typically inherit professional armed forces, and were bedeviled by internal military division. Military operations against ethnic separatist forces were often conducted before central military control was consolidated, fostering military disarray and defeat. Finally, political rhetoric and military tactics often unnecessarily alienated powerful third parties. The resulting external intervention also contributed to military defeat. These political factors frequently reinforced one another. Predictably, internal division and adverse external intervention were correlated with lower levels of economic development.