Political power in Puerto Rico: bankers, pharmaceuticals and the state

Abstract

Puerto Rico is characterized by a high degree of structural economic interdependence between state, corporate, and financial actors. This article argues that the structural interdependence was engineered by United States and Puerto Rico government officials to bolster the island’s economy and the government’s creditworthiness, using U.S. corporate investments, both fixed and financial. Following a critique of the relevance of the literature on structural analyses of state, corporate and financial alliances to the Puerto Rican case, the article defines, identifies, and quantifies the major components of this structural economic interdependence in Puerto Rico. The article concludes that the depth of structural economic interdependence of state, corporate and financial actors has seriously constrained the possibilities of economic and political pluralism. The local government has become bound to a relatively limited range of policy options and, thus, a particular development path is forged. In this case, the policies have resulted in the marginalization of local industry, and the privileging of the financial sector to the detriment of domestic capital formation.