Political culture and economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa

Abstract

This paper argues that the dismal economic performance of much of sub-Saharan Africa since independence can be explained only in part, if at all, by such conventional arguments as adverse geography and inadequate levels of foreign aid. The paper introduces the concepts of the stationary and the roving bandit to provide a political economic foundation for exploring why many such countries perform now less well than was the case under colonial governance. The paper modifies the public choice models of spatial voting, rent seeking and rent extraction to take account of political institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. On this basis, it explains why many such countries rapidly collapsed into one party states and how the “Big Men” of Africa pillage their countries in pursuit of private gain. Case studies of Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo provide detailed institutional insights into the nature of this rapid post-colonial descent into kleptocracy.