Political coalition bargaining behaviour

Abstract

One theme in the anlaysis of coalitions, and collectivities generally, concerns the relationship between the benefits accruing to each coalition member and the resources which each member brings to the coalition. Thus, Browne and Franklin (1973) found that the largest parties in successful parliamentary coalitions tend to have fewer cabinet portfolios than would be expected on the basis of their parliamentary representation, while smaller parties have more such portfolios. A second theme deals with the role of the political entrepreneur in putting together sufficient support to form a ruling group. Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young (1971) have treated some of the ways in which a political entrepreneur may manipulate private goods to generate such support. Part I of this paper represents a preliminary theory of bargaining in political coalitions, based upon a series of assumptions about the behavior of an entrepreneurial (E) party and minor parties. First the basic assumptions underlying the theory are stated and then the model of E party and minor party behavior is derived. In Part II of the paper, our theory is briefly compared to other approaches to coalition formation. The utility of the formulation in evaluating the extant empirical literature and in guiding inquiry is discussed; some specific examples are given.