Polish projects of moral disarmament in the interwar period: J. Pilsudski and J. Beck’s tactics

Abstract

The article examines cooperation between Poland and the League of Nations in the interwar period. Specific attention is given to the role of Polish diplomacy in the development of the moral disarmament project. By “moral disarmament”, as opposed to material disarmament, implied the use of psychological, ethical, and ideological instruments to reduce aggression, create a favorable environment for peace, and encourage the resolution of conflicts through negotiation and diplomacy. Warsaw regularly emphasized the priority of moral disarmament over military disarmament, arguing that disarmament alone would not automatically end military conflicts if the will to fight persisted. These ideas fell on the fertile soil of diplomacy of the time and were perceived as an effective mechanism in the struggle for peace, as they organically fitted into the system of the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the Locarno agreements, representing a logical continuation and development of these ideas. However, despite their potential effectiveness, these projects were not destined to be implemented. This was partly due to the fact that already in the early 1930s, the actual head of Polish foreign policy, J. Piłsudski, came to the conclusion that the League of Nations as such, as well as the system of collective agreements, were ineffective. In that respect he preferred to build relations with neighbors bilaterally.