Policymakers’ Horizon and Trade Reforms

Abstract

Does policymakers’ horizon a!ect their willingness to suppo rt economic reforms? Voting in the U.S. Congress provides an ideal setting to address this question. Di!erences between the House and Senate, in which members serve two-year and six-year mandates respectively, allow to examine the role of term length; the staggered structure of the Senate allows to compare the behavior of di!erent “generations” of senators a nd study the impact of election proximity. Considering all major trade liberalization reforms undertaken by the U.S. since the early 1970’s, we find that Senate members are more likely t os upport them than House members. However, inter-cameral di!erences disappear for t hird-generation senators, who face re-election at the same time as House members. Considering Senate votes alone, we find that the last generation is more protectionist than the previous two, a result that holds both when comparing di!erent senators voting on the same bill and individual senators voting on di!erent bills. Inter-generational di!erences dis appear instead for senators who hold safe seats or have announced their retirement, indicating that the protectionist e!ect of election proximity is driven by legislators’ fear of losing oce.