Points of View

Abstract

AbstractI begin by raising the question whether there can be ‘absolute representations’. This is equivalent to the question whether the world can be represented from no point of view, absoluteness being an extreme form of objectivity. I probe the question, explain its significance and argue for an affirmative answer. I then consider arguments for a negative answer, and suggest that the most compelling of these depend on a kind of transcendental idealism that can be extracted from the work of Kant and Wittgenstein. The problem with such arguments is that the transcendental idealism in question is incoherent. But whence then its appeal? My diagnosis is that such transcendental idealism is the nonsense that results from attempting to express ineffable knowledge that we have. I then apply this idea to a range of further philosophical issues, including the nature of persons, the subject matter of mathematics, anti‐realism, value, and God.