Abstract
Abstract This is a collection of previously published essays that are all concerned, at some level, with the nature, scope, and limits of representation, where by representation is meant the act of representing, truly or falsely, how things are. The collection is divided into three parts. The essays in Part I deal with linguistic representation. One thesis that surfaces at various points in these essays is that some things are ineffable. The essays in Part II deal with representation more generally, and with the character of what is represented. They all touch more or less directly on the distinction between perspectival representation, that is representation from a point of view, and absolute representation, that is representation from no point of view. One thesis that surfaces at various points in these essays is that nothing is ineffable. The essays in Part III, deriving their inspiration from the early work of Wittgenstein, indicate how the resulting tension between Parts I and II is to be resolved. We can construe the first of these theses as a thesis about states of knowledge or understanding, and the second as a thesis about facts or truths.
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