Abstract
Despite the widespread claim that populism and pluralism are incompatible, the latter is rarely defined clearly in the existing literature. This is significant as such purported incompatibility is used to argue that populist politics cannot sit comfortably within liberal democracy. I begin this article by examining the theoretical foundations of research on populism and pluralism, particularly from scholars who adopt the ideational approach. I highlight how this conception of pluralism is limited to protecting minority rights through liberal-democratic institutions, without considering how such institutions are often exclusionary. I then turn to the contributions of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe on populism, pluralism, and hegemony. I suggest that while Mouffe sacrifices the counter-hegemonic potential of populism in pursuit of pluralism, Laclau sacrifices pluralism for counter-hegemony through his insistence that the universal can only be articulated through the particular. Moving beyond Laclau’s part-as-whole formulation, I develop an understanding of pluralism rooted in non-belonging, which grounds plurality in shared constitutive lack. This allows for the advancement of an indeterminate concept of ‘the people’ without the imposition of a universalised particular. Thinking of pluralism in these terms provides critical scholars of populism with a conceptualisation which does not depend solely on a liberal vocabulary.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call