Plato's Euthyphro

Abstract

PLATONISTS today agree to the genuineness of the Euthyphro, the delightful dialogue concerning piety; an occasional voice of protest arose in the nineteenth century, when Ueberweg, for example, suspected the treatise because it classifies impiety as an Idea in the Republic, however, Plato classifies to adikon as an eidos, and Aristotle observes that Plato's theory involves negative Ideas (ton apophaseon ideas).1 Although its authenticity is not questioned by contemporary scholars, the Euthyphro has received in the last thirty years only passing attention, which too frequently, by culling passages from the context, fails to appreciate the dialogue as a unit.2 Only two personae appear: Socrates and Euthyphro the former a defendant and the latter a prosecutor in separate trials which are to take place in the near future (399 B.C.). The Cratylus refers to an inspired authority on the philosophy of names, called Euthyphro, whom Platonists generally regard as the same person.3 A. E. Taylor, however, questions the identification; but he admits that there is no necessary chronological difficulty between the identification and the dramatic date of the Cratylus (soon after the beginning of the Archidamian War) if Euthyphro is assumed to be about fifty years of age and his father seventyfive in 399 B.C. an assumption which, in our opinion, should not seem illogical.4 The important point is that Euthyphro in the dialogue bearing his name is not a young novice, but rather a man of mature years, if not of mature judgment. A moot question is the relation of Euthyphro's views on religion and