PLATO ON TRUTH-VALUE AND TRUTH-APTNESS

Abstract

"Plato on Truth-Value and Truth-Aptness" examines Plato’s conception of truth-value and truth-aptness. The examination focuses on Philebus 36c3-50e4 where Socrates argues that pleasures can be true and false and more precisely that there are various kinds of true and false pleasures. The Philebus passage is the only one in Plato’s corpus where various kinds of truth, falsity, and truth-aptness are examined in close proximity and in relation to one another. Hence it is an especially valuable and, with respect to the topics treated in this paper, neglected site. Socrates distinguishes four kinds of true and false pleasure, which I examine sequentially. In doing so, I argue that Plato distinguishes two kinds of representational truth-value and truth-aptness, propositional and non-propositional respectively, and two kinds of ontic truth-value and truth-aptness, absolute and gradable respectively. On the basis of a key passage at Philebus 42c5-7 the discussion concludes, suggestively but aporetically, with a consideration of how these various kinds of truth-value and truth-aptness are related to one another.