Abstract

Three distinct reasons that Plato calls the rational part of the soul “divine” are analyzed: (1) its metaphysical kinship with the Forms, (2) its epistemological ability to know the Forms, and (3) its ethical capacity to live by them. Supposing these three divine aspects of the rational part are unified in the life of each person, they naturally suggest a process of divinization or “becoming like god” according to which a person (specifically, a philosopher), by (3) living more virtuously, which requires (2) increasingly better knowledge of the Forms, gradually (1) becomes united with them. This process of divinization is in fact found throughout the middle and late dialogues, including the Phaedo, Republic, Symposium, Phaedrus, Timaeus, and the Laws. This synoptic view of the Platonic idea(l) of divinization provides a standard according to which misplaced emphasis, flaws, and tension created by other interpretations are criticized and corrected.

Highlights

  • What does Plato mean when he claims, in the middle and late dialogues, that the soul, and in particular the rational part of the soul, is divine? Answers to this question have not, to my knowledge, received any systematic treatment. Dodds (1945, 19), recognizes the soul’s divinity in passing, and Guthrie (1957, 10-12) points out its probable Orphic and Empedoclean heritage, but without developing the theme in Plato himself

  • In addition to illuminating a recurrent theme in Plato’s philosophy of interest in its own right, will provide a basis upon which to build an adequate interpretation of the intrinsically related Platonic idea(l) of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, “becoming like god.”1 Having done so, I will be able to correct misplaced emphasis, flaws, and tension created by other interpretations of that idea(l)

  • The divinity of the rational part consists of three features. It is divine on account of its metaphysical status: it is, for Plato, both (1a) immortal and, even more importantly, (1b) akin to those supremely divine objects, the Forms. (1a) The immortality of the soul, argued for at length throughout the Phaedo, in Republic 10 (608c-612a), and in the Phaedrus (245c-e), makes the soul just as “deathless”, and divine, as the Homeric gods

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Summary

Introduction

What does Plato mean when he claims, in the middle and late dialogues, that the soul, and in particular the rational part of the soul, is divine? Answers to this question have not, to my knowledge, received any systematic treatment. Dodds (1945, 19), recognizes the soul’s divinity in passing, and Guthrie (1957, 10-12) points out its probable Orphic and Empedoclean heritage, but without developing the theme in Plato himself.

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