Planning in the New York city police department—Politics and process

Abstract

Criminal Justice Planning has been under increasing criticism in the last few years. Most recently, in the House and Senate Hearings which preceded the enactment of the Justice Systems Improvement Act of 1979, the requirement for comprehensive planning was considered by many to be ineffectual at best and a cumbersome burden at worst. By reexamining the planning process we may be able to gain some insight into the use, misuse, and potential of planning as an organizational tool and reassess what can be realistically expected. Through a case study of the way in which the NYCPD implemented and practiced formal planning in the three decades from 1948 to 1978, three problems can be identified. It has been very difficult to operationally define the term planning which has resulted in confusion, conflict, and criticism. There is an inherent conflict between the organization's survival needs and its rational planning processes. ‘Rational’ plans may not take account of changes in the political environment or may be distorted or subverted when implemented by field personnel. It appears that an unexpectedly long time may be necessary for fundamental systemic changes to be accepted in an organization. This means that in a ‘results oriented’ organization, where a plan is expected to ‘be successful’ in one to three years, plans may be discarded before they have been allowed sufficient time to develop. In addition to examining these issues, the study identifies and describes the various phases in the life cycle of the planning unit.