Philosophy of Science, Technique and Technology

I will examine the first of Thomas Kuhn’s Thalheimer Lectures delivered in 1984, with the purpose of establishing a connection between Kuhn’s historiographical thought and his criticism of the traditional distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, or, as I call it, the DJ distinction. In order to do this, I will start by exploring the Kuhnian view of the so-called static approach in philosophy of science, taking as my main reference the work of Bacon, Descartes, and foundationalist epistemology. I will continue by examining the relationship between Kuhnian historiography and the DJ distinction, comparing the first Thalheimer Lecture with other texts published by Kuhn. Finally, I will assert that Kuhn’s rejection of the DJ distinction is the result of adopting a historiographical matrix whose philosophical consequences are irreconcilable with the static approach in history and philosophy of science, for which the DJ distinction is essential.

What was classical genetics?

History of Science and Philosophy of Science. Introductory Remarks. This article introduces two special issues of the journal History of Science Reports (Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte) with contributions on the relationships of history and philosophy of science since the seventeenth century. The introduction begins with a brief reminder of Thomas Kuhn's provocative discussion of the relationship in the 1970s, placing it in the context of the debate of the period over whether the foundation of university departments for History and Philosophy of Science in the United States had led to a mere “marriage of convenience” or something more. Following this the paper briefly outlines the transformative impact of the “practical turn” in both philosophy and history of science since the 1990s, and contends that the relationship of history and philosophy of science has nonetheless become increasingly distant over time. This is due in large part to the professionalisation of history of science and to the recent turn to cultural approaches in that field; both trends have led to the adoption of strictly historicist rather than analytical perspectives on knowledge. General historians, too, are paying more attention to the increasing impact of science and technology, but have at most instrumental use for philosophical perspectives. Thus, the distinct possibility arises that the debate between historical and analytical approaches in philosophy of science is becoming a conversation within one discipline rather than a dialogue between two disciplines: what was once a „marriage of convenience”︁ could end in respectful separation or amicable divorce. The article concludes with brief summaries of the articles published in the two special issues, indicating their relations to specific aspects of the broader topic at hand.

It is widely acknowledged today that continental Logical Empiricism (LE) developed primarily in Vienna and in Berlin. Both capitals Berlin and Vienna gave birth to academic and intellectual groups that presented a challenging new program in philosophy of science. Despite the largely autonomous and independent developments of these particular groups there are, however, some remarkable parallels, relations and interrelations. They are not only related to the respective approaches in philosophy of science or the philosophical programs. There is also a considerable accordance due to the ideological and historical origins, the resulting programmatic foundations, the genesis and the organizational structures. Both groups of intellectuals developed on the basis of already existing organizations and ideological movements, which were, however, amazingly similar in both cities. They represented an intellectual field that included various associations mostly founded at the end of the nineteenth century. They followed what they called a “scientific worldview” (“wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung”) or “scientific world-conception” (“wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung”) – a term that did not reappear until later in the famous Vienna Circle Manifesto of 1929. That included a secular, laically anti-metaphysic program closely associated with the natural sciences (e.g. theory of evolution) which focused on dissemination of knowledge via popular education. It primarily encompassed groups such as the Monists, Freethinkers and followers of non-religious ethics. All these groups wanted to strengthen the role of science in society and public life. Thus, in contesting the claims of other ideological hegemonic forces, they followed necessarily a political approach as well.

Notes on Contributors

En los años setenta cristaliza un nuevo enfoque en la filosofía de la ciencia, el cual venía gestándose desde diferentes direcciones. Se conforma una concepción de teoría empírica —tanto de su naturaleza como de su estructura y función esencialmente distinta de las hasta entonces prevalecientes.
 Para entender la novedad de este enfoque debemos señalar el común denominador de todas las concepciones anteriores. Tomando tres de las corrientes más representativas de la filosofía contemporánea de la ciencia —el empirismo lógico, la escuela de Popper y la corriente historicista—, podemos darnos cuenta de que a pesar de sus radicales e insalvables diferencias, en todas ellas el análisis de las teorías se realiza a través del estudio de sus formulaciones lingüísticas.
 Incluso algunos autores llegan a identificar las teorías con sus formulaciones lingüísticas. De aquí la denominación de “enfoque sintáctico” o “concepción enunciativista”. El ataque a esta concepción enunciativista ha sido emprendido por varios autores que, aunque provienen de tradiciones diversas, tratan de forjar un concepto de teoría más adecuado, tomando como noción central la noción de modelo o aplicación. Los análisis realizados en esta dirección pueden agruparse de manera global bajo el rubro de concepción semántica o concepción modelo-teórica.
 Dentro de esta concepción existen varias líneas de desarrollo. Sólo me referiré a dos de ellas. La primera es la concepción estructural que parte de los trabajos de P. Suppes y es desarrollada principalmente por Sneed, Stegmüler y U. Moulines. La segunda línea es la concepción del espacio-de-estados o espacio-de-fases, que ha sido desarrollada por Evert Beth, Bas van Fraassen y F. Suppe, quienes también parten de los trabajos de P. Suppes y de ciertos análisis pioneros de von Neumann.
 En este trabajo no me ocuparé de las críticas que desde la concepción semántica se hacen al enfoque enunciativista. Mi objetivo presente es analizar el concepto de teoría propuesto por van Fraassen, comparándolo en ciertos aspectos con el propuesto por la concepción estructural.

This article is concerned with the development of philosophy of science in the 1970s. The explanatory framework is the picture of two fundamental split-offs: the controversial establishment of history and sociology of science and of formal philosophy of science as independent disciplines, against the background of more traditional “conceptual” varieties of philosophy of science. I illustrate these developments, which finally led to somewhat “purified” versions of the respective accounts, by examining a case study, namely, that of the structuralist school, which emerged in the 1970s as an attempt to reconcile historical and formal approaches in philosophy of science. I try to explain the failure of this initial program of “Kuhn Sneedified” and its transition to a more purified formalist version, on the basis of the fact that the former attempt was caught somewhere amid the purism of conceptual, historical, and formal accounts of philosophy of science.

On the scientific status of homeopathy

This paper deals with fuzzy sets and fuzzy relations as a new tool for philosophers of science. This philosophical discipline deals with the connections of empirical and theoretical structures. Scientists observe real systems and phenomena and from that they obtain a data structure. To represent that structure they build a model. In this context we say simplistic that there is a "mapping" from reality to theory. The so-called structuralist approach in philosophy of science uses informal logic and informal set theory to axiomatize empirical theories and their intertheoretic relations. It offers two layers of structures: the empirical and the theoretical layer. In this paper we will extend this structuralist view by using fuzzy sets and fuzzy relations to represent structures of perceptions as important components in the philosophy of science. These components have to be settled in an intermediate layer between the empirical and theoretical structures.

Philosophy of science has an important role in the preparation of scientific work, especially in management science, by providing a conceptual framework that integrates aspects of ontology, epistemology and axiology. This research discusses the application of the philosophy of science in the entire research process, starting from problem formulation, developing a theoretical framework, to presenting findings. The philosophy of science approach allows the selection of relevant research paradigms and valid methods to produce applicable and ethical solutions. In addition, philosophy of science contributes to the development of new paradigms, strengthening research ethics, and increasing creativity in scientific research. By using a literature review approach, this research provides insight into how the philosophy of science supports the development of management science through knowledge validation and systematic methodological testing

Notes on Contributors

There has been an ongoing debate about the use of research methods in Information Systems Research (ISR). Despite the international dominance of the behaviourist approach, there is a remarkable number of researchers who propagate alternative methods, such as hermeneutic approaches or the so-called ‘Design-Science’ approach. This report is based on the assumption that the variety of research topics and objectives of ISR cannot be covered in a satisfactory way by one method. Instead, it is claimed that there is need for the configuration of methods according to individual research designs. For this purpose, the report is focussing on the peculiarities of ISR in order to develop the requirements a research method should serve. Subsequently, existing methods, such as the behaviourist, the hermeneutic or the ‘Design Science’ approach are evaluated with respect to these requirements. To develop a common conception of science that fits all disciplines and can be adapted to serve the peculiarities of ISR at the same time, the report gives an overview of selected approaches in philosophy of science. Against this background, a conceptual framework is developed that guides the configuration of individual research methods. It includes the core concepts that constitute the parameters of configuration and supplemental criteria to support configuration decisions. Finally, the framework is adapted to serve as a conceptual foundation for the unified documentation of research results. It fosters comparability of research contributions across the spectrum of possible research methods and contributes to the reconstruction of scientific progress.

This work traces a thread from what might be called a standard account of scientific realism and anti-realism, through Bas van Fraassen’s influential alternative anti-realist accounts of his constructive empiricism and later empiricist structuralism, expressed in his writings that have stimulated vigorous and extended reactions over many years. Via an examination of structural realism, the thread has lead me away from the focus on microphysics, so prevalent in much of the writing in this debate, to a consideration of the problem of complexity in the special sciences, a response from the point of view of biology in particular, where I assert that the complexity of this discipline is incompatible with the idea that biological representation can be usefully mathematized, up to isomorphic description, one of the central tenets of van Fraassen’s structuralist thesis. I argue that understanding scientific models only in terms of mathematical structures is too restrictive and is inappropriate for understanding the diverse phenomenal models prevalent in biology. I discuss alternative, less constrained, more pluralistic ways of matching representation to the world, and separately consider the difficulties of dealing with the ‘disorder of nature’ including the problem of definition of natural kinds, and the associated implications for realism, ending with the question ‘realism about what?’ I conclude with a tentative advocacy for a moderate, perspectival, epistemic realism, similar to Giere’s constructive realism or a species of entity realism, consonant with Paul Churchland’s suggestion that our best grasp on the real resides in the representations provided by our best scientific theories.

This paper aims to understand the two basic concepts that are the focus of the discussion, namely science and religion through a philosophy of science approach. This approach assumes seeing the foundation that allows the development of theoretical arguments about the nature of science (knowledge, science) and religion studied in the basic concepts of Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science that is meant must have been formulated in a contextual-humanist-sociological manner that is social salvation. So that it can make a significant contribution to humanity as a whole. Thus, the Philosophy of Science will dynamically always be in line with the main mission of Islam, namely rahmatan Lil 'ālamīn.

We lay groundwork for applying ethnographic methods in philosophy of science. We frame our analysis in terms of two tasks: (1) to identify the benefits of an ethnographic approach in philosophy of science and (2) to structure an ethnographic approach for philosophical investigation best adapted to provide information relevant to philosophical interests and epistemic values. To this end, we advocate for a purpose-guided form of cognitive ethnography that mediates between the explanatory and normative interests of philosophy of science, while maintaining openness and independence when framing such an investigation to achieve robust unbiased results.