Abstract
In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one was coined in the discussion between Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre. They argue that Husserl’s phenomenology shares similarities with computational functionalism, and the key similarity is between the concept of noema and the concept of mental representation. I show the weaknesses of that reading and argue that there is another available functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology. I propose to shift perspective and approach the relation between phenomenology and functionalism from a methodological perspective, specifically taking into account the functionalist explanatory strategy called functional analysis. I discuss the notion of function in Husserl’s works and Husserl’s idea of functional phenomenology. The key argument I develop is that in functional phenomenology we can find an explanatory strategy which is analogous to the strategy of functional decomposition used in functional analysis. I conclude that the proposed functionalist reading of phenomenology opens a new approach to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences.
Highlights
Functionalism is recognized as one of the most influential approaches to mind and cognition, usually perceived as incongruent with phenomenological approaches descending from the Husserlian tradition
The key argument is that in Husserlian “functional phenomenology”, as introduced in the first book of Ideas, we find an original notion of intentional function as well as a method of decomposition, which can be understood as analogous to the explanatory strategy of functional analysis
I agree with McIntyre that Husserl was not a formalist in regard to mental representations and that a strong computationalist reading of his phenomenology is implausible. Both McIntyre and Dreyfus fail to recognize that there is a further level below the phenomenological transcendental level, that of the eidetic analysis of phenomenological psychology. This distinction is crucial for the functionalist reading of phenomenology and the possibility of integrating it with cognitive science
Summary
Functionalism is recognized as one of the most influential approaches to mind and cognition, usually perceived as incongruent with phenomenological approaches descending from the Husserlian tradition. The key idea behind this version of functionalism is that mental states can be understood as Turing machine table states (Putnam 1960) and the mind as a sort of computer program In this fashion, Dreyfus (Dreyfus and Hall 1982) and McIntyre (1986) proposed computational-functionalist readings of Husserl. Cummins-style functional analysis, which relies on a more general notion of function as a causal-role, will decompose the system into a set of sub-capacities, which contribute to the system’s functioning These sub-capacities are described in dispositional-behavioral terms, and not in computational terms. The key argument is that in Husserlian “functional phenomenology”, as introduced in the first book of Ideas, we find an original notion of intentional function as well as a method of decomposition, which can be understood as analogous to the explanatory strategy of functional analysis.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
