Abstract
The notion of myth is used in legal science very rarely. When it appears, it usually happens in simplified, popular science publications. Basic, “classical” traces of such kind constitute rather linguistic ornaments than scientific explanations. However, in legal science we relatively often deal with statements or phenomena that do not have simple physical or material equivalents. This opens up a mythological perspective, an introduction to the world of duty, obligation, promise. The paper aims at presenting and defining myth in a way that allows one to use it in legal history without diverting its traditional meaning established in religious studies and social anthropology. The author believes that the myth is an inseparable part of the definition of law, certain views of natural law and notions of justice and human rights.
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