Personalization of Executive Power After COVID-19 Onset in South Korea

Abstract

How has COVID-19 affected the personalization of executive power in South Korea? To answer this question, we draw on the conceptual framework of personalization concerning democracies and autocracies. We find that, personalization attempts were made via mechanism of personnel management (e.g., the appointment of allies within the pandemic-response bureaucracy) and via mechanism violence which consists of enacting the Infectious Diseases Control and Prevention Act, which restricted the freedom of assembly of anti-government forces. However, personnel management was more pronounced than the mechanism of violence due to the role of administrative courts and the National Human Rights Commission, which prevented an outright ban of freedom of assembly. Under the Park administration, many personalization attempts were made but not fully realized due to the fragmented command chain within the pandemic bureaucracy. We discuss the prospects of continued personalization under the Yoon administration via personnel management in the pandemic bureaucracy.