Abstract
Through the argument of marginal cases or the argument of species superposition, the moral status of disabled people or people with intellectual disabilities has been addressed. The bioethical debate about the person has been built on the mentalist or actualist conception of the person, according to which a person is a person due to the possession of superior cognitive abilities or properties. It is in this way that the disabled or handicapped have been denied the consideration of persons, considering them under the category of quasi-persons. Furthermore, in this debate there is enormous terminological confusion about how to refer to them. This work addresses a brief history of the philosophical problem of the person and aims to shed light on the moral status of the intellectually disabled person within the debate on the defense of animals. The person with intellectual disabilities is also a person.
Published Version
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