Abstract

Subject The risks of highly presidential and personalist systems. Significance All electoral democracies in Latin America are headed by presidents elected for fixed terms of office. Unlike most parliamentary systems, they are expected to remain in place even if their political support has collapsed and they can no longer secure legislative approval for key policies, nor ratification of their ministerial appointments. Leaders discredited as head of government must in principle remain in post as head of state, potentially putting the entire constitutional system at risk. Impacts Current low approval ratings for many regional presidents highlight the risks associated with personalist government. However, greater ease in removing unpopular leaders could lead to rapid government turnover and more instability. Weak legislatures may fail to exercise curbs on executive power, while coalition-building may fuel corruption to guarantee governability.

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