Crisis and Rapid Reequilibration: The Consequences of Presidential Challenge and Failure in Latin America

Abstract

Juan Linz posited his "perils of presidentialism" argument in 1978. Yet contrary to Linz's predictions, since then presidential democracies have been much less likely to break down. Still, presidents continue to confront challenges to remaining in office for their full terms. Between 1978 and 2006 30% of all democratically-elected presidents worldwide faced serious efforts to remove them from office, and 12% were actually forced from office prior to the end of their terms. Thus far scholars have focused on the sources of these crises. In this paper, by contrast, we focus on their effects. Do these crises represent a serious new peril of presidentialism, or, to echo Linz, do we see crisis and re-equilibration, with few lasting consequences? This empirical question has important theoretical and normative implications. If we observe profound consequences following from these challenges, then even with the military largely sidelined and regime collapse not at issue, presidentialism would remain associated with normatively bad outcomes. Yet if we find that challenges or failures have minimal effects, then early presidential exit may represent an under-appreciated equilibrating mechanism that helps resolve executivelegislative conflict. In this case, early presidential exit might actually reveal democracy's vitality across the region. Both the pessimistic and optimistic views find some conjectural support among scholars, yet more systematic empirical analysis provides little support for the pessimistic view. Although presidential challenges and falls are surely difficult crises, their effects are limited and ephemeral. We thus conclude that challenges and falls cause only superficial and ephemeral damage to democratic governance in Latin America.