Performance management and political accountability: how local governments respond to performance feedback

Abstract

ABSTRACT Using the results of an annual assessment of local governments’ integrity levels from 2012 to 2016, we explore how Korea’s local governments respond to performance feedback provided by the central government. First, we find clear performance improvement only among localities performing below the average of their social comparison groups. This result supports the negativity bias hypothesis, which posits that policymakers are driven more by negative than by positive information. Second, local governments’ responses to feedback increased as election dates approached. This outcome suggests that electoral incentives magnify the effectiveness of performance management. Third, negative performance information released immediately before elections is associated with the incumbents’ electoral defeat, which is consistent with the hypothesis that performance information helps citizens hold policymakers accountable during elections. Overall, the findings imply that performance management (managerial accountability) and elections (political accountability) are mutually reinforcing mechanisms and that voter myopia can partially erode this synergy.