Abstract
Primates interpret conspecific behaviour as goal-directed and expect others to achieve goals by the most efficient means possible. While this teleological stance is prominent in evolutionary and developmental theories of social cognition, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. In predictive models of social cognition, a perceptual prediction of an ideal efficient trajectory would be generated from prior knowledge against which the observed action is evaluated, distorting the perception of unexpected inefficient actions. To test this, participants observed an actor reach for an object with a straight or arched trajectory on a touch screen. The actions were made efficient or inefficient by adding or removing an obstructing object. The action disappeared mid-trajectory and participants touched the last seen screen position of the hand. Judgements of inefficient actions were biased towards the efficient prediction (straight trajectories upward to avoid the obstruction, arched trajectories downward towards the target). These corrections increased when the obstruction's presence/absence was explicitly acknowledged, and when the efficient trajectory was explicitly predicted. Additional supplementary experiments demonstrated that these biases occur during ongoing visual perception and/or immediately after motion offset. The teleological stance is at least partly perceptual, providing an ideal reference trajectory against which actual behaviour is evaluated.
Highlights
Human and non-human primates take the ‘intentional stance’ when watching conspecifics [1], interpreting their behaviour as purposeful and goal-directed [2,3,4,5,6]
The present study showed for the first time that the teleological interpretation humans have of others’ behaviour is perceptually instantiated and provides a visual reference signal for an expected ‘ideal’ trajectory during action observation
Perceptual reports were consistently biased towards the ideal reference kinematics
Summary
Human and non-human primates take the ‘intentional stance’ when watching conspecifics [1], interpreting their behaviour as purposeful and goal-directed [2,3,4,5,6] Crucial to this is the understanding that others’ actions are optimized to achieve their goals in the most efficient and rational way, minimizing time and energy expenditure, given the environmental constraints. Both human infants and macaque monkeys, for example, show surprise when intentional agents do not attempt to avoid an obstacle, or take an unnecessary long way to reach their goal [5,7]. Seeing such actions captures attention [9] and alters activity in brain areas implicated in action perception and mentalizing (e.g. [10,11])
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