Abstract
Chapter 7 introduces a distinction between two kinds of evidence: phenomenal evidence (evidence that corresponds to how our environment sensorily seems to us) and factive evidence (evidence that is determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related). Regardless of whether we are perceiving, hallucinating, or suffering an illusion, we have phenomenal evidence. However, when we perceive, we have additional factive evidence. The rational source of both phenomenal and factive evidence lies in employing perceptual capacities: perceptual states have epistemic force due to the epistemic and metaphysical primacy of employing perceptual capacities in perception over employing them in hallucination or illusion. So epistemic force stems from an asymmetric dependence of the employment of perceptual capacities in hallucination and illusion on their employment in perception. Insofar as both kinds of evidence stem from properties of the perceptual capacities employed, capacitism provides a unified account of phenomenal and factive evidence.
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