Abstract
I will exploit the basic commitments of capacitivism to develop a distinctive externalist view of perceptual knowledge. The basic idea of capacitivism is that perception is constitutively a matter of employing perceptual capacities that function to discriminate and single out particulars in our environment. It is because a given subject is employing perceptual capacities with a certain function that her mental states have epistemic force. Employing such perceptual capacities constitutes a mental state that provides us with phenomenal evidence, and employing such capacities in the good case also provides us with knowledge-worthy factive evidence. Capacitivism is an externalist view that does not invoke reliability, remains steadfastly naturalistic, and by recognizing a metaphysically substantive common element between perception and hallucination avoids any commitment to disjunctivism.
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