Abstract
In this paper, I defend a new theory of the nature and individuation of perceptual capacities. I argue that we need a theory of perceptual capacities to explain modal facts about what sorts of perceptual phenomenal states one can be in. I defend my view by arguing for three adequacy constraints on a theory of perceptual capacities: perceptual capacities must be individuated at least partly in terms of their place in a hierarchy of capacities, where these capacities include the senses themselves; an adequate account of perceptual capacities must be sensitive to empirical considerations; and an adequate account should accommodate the nature of the capacity to perceive. I arrive at these constraints by considering how Schellenberg’s view fails, before defending and developing my alternative in line with the constraints. I defend a view on which there are few, coarse-grained perceptual capacities which can fulfil complex explanatory roles because they are evaluatively gradable on many axes. Finally, on my view, perceptual capacities bear a particularly close relation to the sensory modalities themselves.
Highlights
In the philosophy of mind, the notions of capacity and ability have recently been asked to do substantive philosophical work
The picture will appeal if we think—in line with Schellenberg’s externalism—that we have fully identified the fundamental natures of perceptual capacities independently of any facts about the subject, and only afterwards think about how they may relate to the sensory modalities
How can we show that the answer is necessary, on Schellenberg’s view? First, remember that her individuation of perceptual capacities gives their nature in terms of their function, and so if a capacity functions to discriminate cubes, it has that function necessarily
Summary
We have a wide range of capacities and abilities. Some of these are agentive, like the capacity to ride a bike, or to play tennis. We may have epistemic interests, since perceptual capacities plausibly play a role in explaining what perceivers can know. By focussing on the phenomenal features of perception in developing an account of perceptual capacities, I do not deny that they may help explain epistemic features. I will turn to Schellenberg’s recent work, since it provides an incredibly detailed picture of the function, individuation, and possession conditions of perceptual capacities which aims to give them a privileged explanatory role. It is by considering why Schellenberg’s view is unsuccessful in Sects. 2 and 3 that I will develop my alternative
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