Perception, Conceptual Construction and Yogic Cognition According to Kamalasila's Epistemology

Abstract

The nature of direct perception (pratyaksa 直接知覺；現量) is one of the most important topics in the Logico-Epistemological (pramana) School of Buddhism in India. In this paper, I tried to give more or less a general explanation as to how direct perception is defined by Kamalasila 蓮華戒 (ca. 740-795 C.E.), one of the most brilliant scholar-monks of the school after the establishment of the philosophical system by Dharmakirti 法稱 (ca. 600-660). In the course of analysis, the relation between direct perception and conceptual construction (kalpana, 分別) was also elucidated. Dignaga 陳那 (ca. 480-540) defined conceptual construction as namajatya diyojana which usually means 'the connection of a name, genus, etc.' Dharmakirti, on the other hand, defined the same notion as 'a cognition associated with an expression' (abhilapini pratitiḥ). Interestingly enough, he did not explicitly state the relationship between his own definition and that by Dignaga. This fact urged Santaraksita's and likewise his eminent disciple Kamalasila's serious examinations of the relationship between the two definitions. Indicating three different possible interpretations of Dign aga's definition, Kamalasila finally reached the conclusion that what was intended by Dignaga and Dharmakirti was none other than the same. Another basic difference discernible in Dignaga's and Dharmakirti's epistemological views is the definition of direct perception itself. Namely, Dignaga defined direct perception as the cognition which is free from conception (pratyaksam kalpana podham;＂現量除分別＂according to Xuanzang's expression). Dharmakirti added to it the further element 'non-erroneous'; i.e., (The cognition which is) free from conception and is non-erroneous is direct perception (pratyaksam kalpanapodham abbrantam). The second chapter of this paper was spent for the observations on the meaning of 'non-erroneous.' In the third chapter, I pointed out a few problems underlying the definition of direct perception, especially in terms of yogic cognition (yogijn a na) or perception (yogipratyaksa). Special attention was directed toward how one can meditate on religious truths such as ＂All beings are momentary＂ through direct perception without any intervention by conceptual construction. A careful examination of the passages in the Bhavanakrama reveals that Kamalasila holds the opinion that the attainment of yogic perception, which should belong to mental cognition, and not to sense-perception, is realized when one reaches the first of the ten stages in the Mahay ana bodhisattva praxis. Kamalasila was possibly the first person that gave an explicit and well-systematized statement as to how a yogic cognition defined by the Logico- Epistemological School should be related to the traditional Mahayana system of practice.