Pension Reforms in India: Unresolved Issues and Policy Choices

Abstract

Ageing populations with increased life expectancy, low mortality rates, and decreasing and volatile returns in financial markets have made old age financial security difficult. Further, escalating costs of the pension system are forcing the Indian government to re- evaluate its programmes providing social security to its employees. The government has so far received three official reports (namely, OASIS, IRDA, and Bhattacharya) which have examined the issue and suggested several measures to provide a safety net to the ageing population. This paper examines the recommendations made in these reports and analyses the potential effects of them. It is organized around five policy questions: Should the reformed system create individual (funded defined-contribution) accounts or should it remain a single collective fund with a defined-benefit formula? The policy issue is who bears the risk - individual or society collectively. If individual accounts are adopted, should public or private agencies administer the reformed system? The issues that need to be resolved are: the magnitude of intermediation costs, agency problem (principal-agent fiduciary relationship), and the costs to administer the plan. Should fund managers of retirement savings be allowed to invest in a diversified portfolio that includes shares and private bonds? Equity markets are highly volatile and go through long periods of feasts and famine. Guarantees need to be provided in the form of minimum return or providing minimum basic pension on retirement and the bearer of these conjectural liabilities needs to be decided. What should be the level of government fiscal support in the form of tax subsidy, foregone tax collections, grants, administrative costs incurred by its agencies, and level of assumed contingent liabilities in case the government guarantees minimum pension? The crucial question is: how much and to whom is this subsidy accruing? Should the government move toward advance funding of its pension obligations for its employees or should these obligations continue to be financed on pay-as-you-go basis? The present problem in the government pension system is due to successive governments behaving like Santa Clauses ignoring the cost to the exchequer. Mere privatization would not be able to solve these problems. An all-embracing pension reform is not possible overnight. Efforts should be made to find ways of supporting new systems that may supplement existing systems. Suggested measures include: A tax-financed and means-tested system for lower income groups. To build second pillar, continue publicly managed public system for people earning less than Rs 6,500 a month; and for others who can bear the risk, appoint an independent regulator to help develop and supervise private sector in offering risk- return efficient pension products with tax subsidy already available under Section B0CCC. There is no moral justification in India for providing tax benefits to privileged groups to build third pillar. Government should refrain from frequent tinkering of tax laws to benefit a few. This paper also suggests specific fiscal and other measures for implementing a feasible and viable pension system in lndian conditions. For the present, the least that the government can do is to appoint an independent regulator who would also act as developer and make EPFO an independent agency having professional experts on its board.