Peirce Versus Davidson on Metaphorical Meaning

Abstract

Donald Davidson (1978) has forcefully argued that a metaphor carries no meaning other than its literal meaning. The cognitive significance of metaphor is, rather, that it causes an interpreter to perceive a certain similarity, or provokes certain insights. But according to Charles Peirce (1907), meaning in general involves a type of causal process. The distinction, on which Davidson’s arguments rest, between what is conveyed and what is merely caused by an expression, collapses within Peirce’s theory of signs. Reviewing the literature, I will make a few points regarding Peirce’s view of metaphor. I will then explain how Davidson’s arguments fail within his theory of signs, as those arguments are based on a rigid distinction that is loosened by Peirce. Here I provide an exposition and defense of a causal view of the object-sign-interpretant relation. Finally, I present independent reasons to favor the theory that obscures the aforementioned distinction.