Peacemaking in Asia: The United States, Great Britain, and the Japanese Decision to Recognize Nationalist China, 1951?52

Abstract

One of the great distortions of international politics since World War II has been the truncated relations between Japan and mainland China. Despite geographical proximity, mutual trade needs, and cultural affinity, Japan did not give diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China (PRC) until 1978. One obstacle to normalized relations between the two nations was the peace pact Japan signed with the rump Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan a few hours before the termination of the allied occupation of Japan on 28 April 1952. This Japanese decision was preceded by more than one year of prolonged and often heated controversy among American, British, Japanese, and Nationalist diplomats. This paper focuses on the Anglo-American conflict over Sino-Japanese relations and its impact on Japan's decision to recognize Nationalist China in 1952. Japan replaced China as the key to the Truman administration's plans for the Pacific region as the chances of the Nationalist Chinese regime of Chiang Kai-shek surviving the civil war with the Communists grew dimmer. Prodded by George F. Kennan and the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, American policymakers decided in the fall of 1947 to halt the peace treaty initiative of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), for fear that an early settlement would leave Japan demilitarized and neutral in the developing Cold War. Instead, they cooperated with conservative business and political leaders in emasculating many of the reforms of the first years of the occupation and promoted an economic recovery program designed to make Japan the industrial "workshop" of Asia. Southeast Asia, rather than mainland China, was projected as the primary source for Japan's industrial raw materials and foodstuffs and as a major outlet for capital goods exports. At the same time, American officials made military plans for Japan and Southeast Asia to bolster non-Communist regimes and facilitate economic integration of the region. The new programs for Japan and Southeast Asia were implicitly directed at containing communism in China.1