Peacekeeping: United Nations Role Sharing

Abstract

Conclusions * Efforts of the United States, Canada and others to strengthen the UN's competence to manage peace operations have borne fruit. * The UN peacekeeping infrastructure has been strengthened through reorganization and the addition of highly qualified personnel. * The Secretariat has enhanced its management capabilities. * However, proliferating conflict situations, financial stringencies, the reluctance of some UN members, and competing interests within the UN impede reform. * Despite improved oversight capacities, the Security Council has indicated that it intends to be cautious in authorizing new peacekeeping operations, especially when cease-fire agreements by disputants are absent. As a result, major UN peace operations are less likely in the foreseeable future. * UN Secretariat emphasis will be closer coordination between itself and humanitarian assistance agencies assisting war-ravaged nation-states, as well as shoring up ties with regional groups who assume increased peacekeeping roles. Strengthening UN Capabilities Decisions made by the UN Security Council (UNSC) during the remainder of 1996 will determine whether the organization is able to maintain its progress in building a competence to manage peacekeeping operations involving military forces. Considerable progress has been made since 1992. The United States, Canada and other governments have actively supported efforts to enhance the Secretariat's capacity to plan and manage military operations to include more effective coordination among the UN elements. In 1994, three new departmentsCknown as the TriadCwere created to function as crisis management and coordinating centers for the Secretary-General. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) would deal with political questions; the Department of Peacekeeping Opera-tions (DKPO) would be the mission planner and operator; and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) would coordinate the UN's Acivilian agencies. The integration of several civilian and military Secretariat elements, including field operations, into a single DPKO was a major part of the reform. Other improvements over the past 24 months give the UN its first professional apparatus for managing peacekeeping. These include: * A major increase in the number of expatriate staff for DPKO, including secondment by member countries of over 100 military officers (12 from the United States); * Creation of a 24-hour-a-day situation room to monitor field operations by UN elements and to provide early warning of crises; * Establishment of a mission planning staff to provide estimates of troops, materiel, and financial needs when contemplating peace operations; * Creation of a professional training program for officers assigned to peacekeeping missions; and * Development of an intelligence sharing system, largely U.S., responsive to the needs of senior Secretariat officials. The UN leadership has also established a small permanent core staff of experienced military officers for contingency planning and immediate dispatch to crisis areas as an advance Headquarters unit. Strategic Overstretch Despite these notable gains in the management of UN-deployed peacekeeping forces, the Headquarters Secretariat recognizes that the organization has a limited capacity to deal with the complex emergencies arising from the collapse of nation-state authority in Africa and elsewhere, as well as those requiring the use of large military forces. The real and proliferating dangers since 1989 have been the murderous conflicts within member countries. The collapse of governing institutions, the deaths of thousands of civilians, as well as the migration of millions of refugees across borders threaten the stability of neighbors. The UN has learned that, although such turbulence is an underlying constant in the international arena, some UN members, after the experience of UNOSOM II in Somalia and UNPROFOR in Bosnia are no longer prepared to make available the military forces and budgetary support for major operations, absent clear consent by all major parties to the conflict. …