Past its Prime? The Future of the US-Japan Alliance

Abstract

Early on the morning of 31 March 2003, a five-man medical team from Japan--the sole Japanese contingent on the ground near Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom--was ordered by Tokyo to pack up and move back to Damascus to avoid potential harm. (1) In December, the killing of two Japanese diplomats in Iraq caused over 80 percent of Japan's public to demand a slowdown or outright halt in Tokyo's commitment to send troops to Iraq. (2) Similar sentiments rose during the Japanese hostage crisis of early April 2004. Some Japanese commentators even predict the downfall of Prime Minister Koizumi should any ground forces deployed to Iraq be killed--a potentiality that has made Tokyo extremely cautious with the use of those troops. (3) Contrast this tormented intransigence with the Japanese Diet's rapid passage of anti-terrorism legislation in November 2001 and the dispatch of destroyers and tankers to refuel Coalition forces in the Indian Ocean. Consider also the sight o f Japanese and American naval special forces fast-roping from an Australian helicopter to the deck of a freighter in the Coral Sea to check for potential ballistic missiles in September 2003. This training exercise, the first within the new Proliferation Security Initiative, is indicative of Tokyo's warm embrace of this particular collective security enterprise. These examples highlight the strange dichotomy that the US-Japan Security Alliance represents. On one hand, the Japanese are reluctant to share substantive risk in ventures in Southwest Asia, even though they receive more than 91 percent of their oil from that region. On the other hand, the Japanese are readily embracing other initiatives with their increasingly capable military forces which might improve their security. Over the next two to three decades, Japan will present an increasing paradox to the United States. Japan will liberalize and expand its security posture in broad ways long sought by the United States, but at the same time will increasingly desire to chart its own course in foreign policy. (4) In terms of reliability as a security partner across a range of issues, Japan will tend to become more Gaullist than Thatcherite, more French than British in its response to American pressure for concerted action. Current alliance closeness (which has caused a good deal of euphoria among normally pessimistic alliance managers on both sides) may be an illusion that highlights the crossing of strategic vectors, not the convergence of them. In the future, the United States should not expect enhanced congruence in interests and methods with Japan, especially after the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Because of the coming strategic divergence, the United States should hedge and pursue a two-pronged grand strategy of attempting to buttress the alliance with Japan while seeking alternative means to maintain a forward presence and power-projection basing in the East Asian littorals. The American vital interest in East Asia is the maintenance of a stable, liberal balance of power in the region, not any particular alliance orientation. (5) The alliance with Japan has been a highly convenient and effective means for achieving this balance. However, as interests diverge in coming decades, the pact may not offer the same benefits. As Rajan Menon notes, the age of formal alliances in East Asia may be coming to an end. (6) In order to present the argument for the United States to adopt a strategic hedge in Northeast Asia, this article will set the foundation by examining the notion of alliance reliability and the competing values that dominate, and obfuscate, Japanese strategic intentions. Next, the trends both enhancing and reducing alliance reliability between the two partners will be outlined. This discussion will lead to specific predictions about the next two decades in the alliance relationship and policy recommendations for the United States. Differing Connotations of Alliance Reliability States create security alliances with other states for a variety reasons. …