Between Peace and War: The Proliferation Security Initiative and North Korea

Abstract

Pressure from the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)One of the more ambitious programs that could be employed to put pressure on the Kim regime of North Korea is PSI. PSI's interdiction regime lies on a continuum of containment that includes isolation, economic sanctions, interdiction, and blockade. The DPRK has always been relatively isolated from the international community, by circumstance and by choice. The United States and many other countries already impose extensive economic sanctions on the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK).PSI was introduced on May 31, 2003. The first meeting was held in Madrid on June 12, 2003, when eleven charter members met: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Japan was the only Asian member.Membership is multilateral but restricted. PSI's methods were not spelled out in detail, but they inevitably involved interdiction of transport. Interdiction was initially to be limited to legal interdictions within the territorial waters of member states. However, the possibility of creatively interpreting international law was leftopen for the future. What was never made clear was whether PSI was primarily targeted at certain illicit activities or at certain states.Prospects for PSI's SuccessEconomic sanctions have a mixed record of success. A study by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (i990), with further conclusions by Elliott (2003), found that sanctions were at least partially successful in 34 percent of ii5 examined cases. Surprisingly, success was negatively correlated with international cooperation. Sanctions were most e∂ective when: (i) The goal was relatively modest; (2) The target state was economically weak and politically unstable; (3) The sanctioning state and target state were initially on good terms; (4) The sanctions were imposed quickly and decisively; and (5) The sanctioning state was able to avoid high costs to itself.A collection of papers on sanctions edited by Haass (i998) reached the following conclusions: (i) Sanctions alone rarely achieve their desired result if the aims are large or the time to achieve them is short; (2) Sanctions are more e∂ective when used in conjunction with other policy tools, e.g., threat or military force; (3) Unilateral sanctions are rarely e∂ective; (4) Sanctions often produce unintended and undesirable consequences; (5) Sanctions can be expensive to the sanctioning state; (6) Authoritarian societies are often able to withstand sanctions; (7) Military enforcement can increase the impact of sanctions; (8) Sanctions can increase the pressure to intervene militarily when they are unable to resolve a crisis; (9) Sanctions are easier to introduce than to lift; and (i0) States often tire of imposing sanctions when they fail to achieve their goal.Sanctions may also have unstated goals. For example, they may serve to calm a domestic political audience that demands a quick solution. They may buy time in the absence of a better strategy. They may serve as a first, peaceful, stepping stone toward stronger measures-similar to the idea of hawk engagement (Cha, 2002; Cha and Kang, 2003). They may intentionally or unintentionally provoke the target state to make the first military move, thus justifying the use of force by the sanctioning state.Participation in PSINeither China, Russia, nor the Republic of Korea (ROK) is a PSI member. Yet these are the regional powers with the largest stake in the future of the DPRK. Japan is a PSI member, and played a central role in the PSI exercise o∂ the coast of Australia in September 2003. In the exercise, dubbed Pacific Protector, a coast guard vessel intercepted the target vessel. Because interdiction of a foreign ship would violate law, the exercise designated the target as Japanese (Asahi Shimbun, 2003). Japan, China, the ROK, and Russia say they are opposed to instituting sanctions against the DPRK until other options have been exhausted. …