Abstract
In the 1970s, quantitative science studies were being pursued by sociologists, historians, and information scientists. Philosophers were part of this discussion, but their role would diminish as sociology of science asserted itself. An antiscience bias within the sociology of science became evident in the late 1970s, which split the science studies community, notably causing the “citationists” to go their own way. The main point of contention was whether science was a rational, evidence-based activity. To reverse the antiscience trend, it will be necessary to revive philosophical models of science, such as Bayesian confirmation theory or explanatory coherence models, where theory-experiment agreement plays a decisive role. A case study from the history of science is used to illustrate these models, and bibliometric and text-based methods are proposed as a source of data to test these models.
Highlights
I have been fortunate to spend my professional life in the field of what we can call “quantitative science studies” in the company of many inspiring mentors, colleagues, and collaborators
In 1970, the field, broadly conceived, consisted of a motley group of disaffected historians, sociologists, philosophers, and information scientists searching for new ways of understanding science as a technical, social, and cultural phenomenon
This paper suggests a new direction for quantitative science studies: Why should we believe the findings of science? I have argued that it will be important for quantitative science studies to address confirmation in science and the role of evidence in that process
Summary
I have been fortunate to spend my professional life in the field of what we can call “quantitative science studies” in the company of many inspiring mentors, colleagues, and collaborators. Thereafter, I became aware of a large contingent of European sociologists of science who espoused a new approach to science studies called social construction. While there may be newer, less extreme, versions of the social construction of science (Giere, 1988), it is not surprising that the approach has given rise to negative attitudes toward the practice and findings of science both on the part of sociologists and the society at large. This can be damaging when it comes to existential issues such as climate change. Has the warming of the climate been socially constructed by climate scientists to further their interests? The core question is why should we take this science seriously?
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
