Abstract

This article uses established measures of party difference and party cohesion to analyze the effects of emerging two-party competition in contested roll call votes in the South Carolina House of Representatives, 1977-1987. The analysis also treats legislative voting in the state with respect to the party affiliation of governors. The results reveal little convincing evidence of party as a major reference source for legislative roll call behavior in South Carolina. Even though there are some examples of stronger party-based voting, they appear to occur in a random fashion rather than on the basis of a major, organized attempt by legislators to vote along party lines. The findings suggest that further research is needed to explore the cues for legislative party voting in South Carolina and to identify influences with which to compare state legislative voting experiences, particularly in the other southern states.

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