Part-Whole Metaphysics Underlying Issues of Internality/Externality.

Abstract

In this article, it is argued that our access to internal/external issues is mediated and enabled by part-whole metaphysics. First, Husserl's distinction between two kinds of parts - pieces and moments - and the way in which they differ is presented, and the relations of foundation by which a whole is constituted are discussed. Next, it is shown that Husserl is unable to uphold the distinction between pieces and moments as soon as truly organized objects are encountered. Consequently, pieces should receive a new status and the idea that wholes made up of pieces have an own kind of law is forwarded. This kind of regularity has to do with the junctional organization of organized wholes made up of pieces. The article then focuses on an exemplary kind of organized wholes, living beings, and the suspicion is raised that the combinatory form invoked to take into account the wholeness of a living being points to a law proper to the domain of the living. Therefore, an alternative account for the parts and whole of living beings is necessary. This account is prepared by introducing the basic Aristotelian notions of substance and essence. Next, Aristotle's distinction between posterior and posterior parts and wholes is presented. Based on this distinction, a solution is offered for the problem of the law exhibited in the wholeness of living beings. The combinatory form or soul of a living being appears in Husserl's account as a product of the unsatisfactory distinction between pieces and moments. In Aristotle's account, the form of living beings appears as a necessary condition of possibility for taking into account the specific way in which a living being forms a whole and has parts. Moreover, the Aristotelian soul enables us to consider the functional organization of a living being. In the conclusion, a number of implications of part-whole metaphysics for internal/external issues is formulated.