THE ARISTOTELIAN LEGISLATOR AND POLITICAL NATURALISM

Abstract

Aristotle's assertion inPolitics1.2 that there is a natural impulse to form political communities is immediately contraposed with the claim that the person responsible for their foundation is the cause (αἴτιος) of the greatest of goods (Pol. 1253a33). The attribution of an essential role to the legislator as an efficient cause appears to clash, however, with Aristotle's political naturalism. If thepolisexists by nature and humans are by nature political animals (1253a1–2), then the question arises as to why active intervention by the legislator is necessary for apolis. Conversely, if thepolisis an artefact of practical reason, then Aristotle's distinction between products of the intellect and natural entities seems to preclude the status of thepolisas natural. In light of this apparent tension between different aspects of Aristotle's account of the origins of political communities, the current paper seeks to demonstrate their reconcilability. Section 1 considers the role of the Aristotelian legislator in light of broader Greek assumptions regarding law-making. Section 2 then considers the status of law-making expertise (νομοθετική) as part of political science (πολιτική) and examines the mode of practical reason that is exercised by the legislative founder. Finally, in section 3, and building on recent interpretations which have emphasized that Aristotle operates with an extended teleological conception of nature, I argue that acts of legislative founding and nature can consistently serve as joint causes of thepolis, because the ‘products’ of the practical rationality of the architectonic legislator are themselves an expression of distinctly human nature.