Parental Investment as a Game of Chicken

Abstract

We model mates' interdependent parental investment decisions as a game of Chicken. An individual is better off (in terms of reproductive success) deserting one's offspring to start a new union if one's mate stays to raise the offspring, but better off not deserting if one's mate would in turn desert the offspring. Modelling the parental investment decisions as a game of Chicken leads to four hypotheses: An individual is more likely to desert if (1) the mate is more committed to the offspring, (2) the mate has more resources to invest in children, (3) the former mate is currently unmarried, and (4) the children are older (in sharp contrast to the prediction by both Trivers [1972] and Dawkins and Carlisle [1976]). Data from the 1992 U.S. Current Population Survey provide at least partial support for all hypotheses except Hypothesis 2. In particular, the data analysis strongly supports our prediction that individuals are more likely to desert older children than younger children even when time since separation is controlled for, and rejects the earlier prediction by Trivers (1972) and Dawkins and Carlisle (1976).