Parallelism, Interactionism, and Causation

Abstract

One may gather from the arguments of two of the last papers1 published before his death that J. L. Mackie held the following three theses concerning the mind/body problem: 1There is a distinct realm of mental properties, so a dualism of properties at least is true and materialism false. 2All bodily movements probably have sufficient causes in physical facts and properties, but mental facts and properties are not causally irrelevant to human action. 3At the same time, the view that there are not sufficient causes in the physical realm alone for all bodily movements has no good and adequate empirical or philosophical reasons against it. In this paper I wish (1) to register my strong agreement with the first thesis by way of simply taking it for granted, (2) to defend the second thesis in greater detail and in a manner somewhat different from Mackie's, and (3) to show the third thesis to be false.