Abstract
Some philosophers associated with the post-Kantian Continental traditions in philosophy (for example, Marx and Nietzsche) think that the etiology of a belief can impugn the epistemic status of that belief, leading us, correctly, to be “suspicious” of it; let us call them “Etiological Critics. Many analytic philosophers, responding to these and related etiological critiques within Anglophone philosophy are unimpressed. These analytic philosophers agree that facts about the etiology of belief might bring to one’s attention epistemically relevant considerations—for example, the fact that other possible epistemic peers disagree with one’s beliefs—but they deny that the etiology itself has any direct bearing on the epistemic status of belief (in particular, whether it is doxastically justified). I argue that etiology is directly relevant to the epistemic status of belief, arguing against White and Srinivasan, using examples from Marx and Nietzsche.
Published Version
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