Papineau's Physicalism

Abstract

In his introduction to Philosophical Naturalism, Papineau mentions that he had intended, at one time, to call book Philosophical Physicalism. In end, he writes, he rejected that title, partly for fear that term might have suggested commitment to a metaphysical position tied closely to ontology and categories dictated by current physics, a commitment he is anxious not to incur; and partly because concerns of book as a whole are wider than would have been suggested by rejected title. Nevertheless, early chapters of book make it clear that first choice of title would have been, in some ways, a more accurate guide to character of Papineau's convictions about a number of central issues in metaphysics, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Specifically, Papineau's views about relationships between what he calls the special and physical in general, and between psychological and physical in particular, fall into a sector of naturalist territory that is indisputably physicalistic. I shall concentrate here on two lines of thought from these early chapters: first, Papineau's characterisation of physicalism, by means of two doctrines he calls supervenience and token congruence, in Chapter 1; second, a puzzle he raises in Chapter 2 for those who are content with a physicalism sufficiently weak to allow for variable realisation.