Abstract
Pairwise equilibria (in which voters are paired off in such a way that the voters in each pair ‘cancel each other out’) are studied in the context of voting models where candidates may be uncertain about voters' choices — and, therefore, may have expectations (about those choices) that are not deterministic. Section 2 provides notation and assumptions for a model where the candidates' expectations are based on the ratios of scale values assigned to their strategies. Section 3 derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the candidates' strategies to be a pairwise equilibrium for each of the feasible mappings to their expectations. Section 4 identifies the implications for a corresponding model in which the candidates' expectations are (alternatively) based on scale differences.
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