Package-type strategies and packaging's carbon reduction decisions in the take-out industry

Abstract

Using environmentally friendly packaging (E-packaging) instead of non-environmentally friendly packaging (N-packaging) can mitigate pollution and reduce carbon emissions. However, the market penetration rate of E-packaging is low, and the packaging carbon reduction level is uneven. This study uses game theory models to examine the factors affecting packaging carbon reduction levels and fees as well as firms' package-type decisions. First, we obtain the optimal solutions for packaging manufacturers and firms when they use different types of packaging under monopoly and competition, respectively. We find that green competition reduces the carbon reduction level of E-packaging, whereas price competition can increase it under certain conditions. The unit manufacturing cost of N-packaging and cost coefficient of carbon reduction are critical considerations for package-type decisions. When the unit manufacturing cost of N-packaging is low and the cost coefficient is large, no firm uses E-packaging. We also demonstrate that firms in a competitive market may become trapped in a prisoner's dilemma after making package-type decisions. Interestingly, we show that the firms' package-type decisions can hurt consumers and welfare under certain conditions, depending on the N-packaging's unit manufacturing cost and pollution damage factor. Our findings provide insights for packaging manufacturers, firms, and environmental regulatory agencies, and can help promote E-packaging.