Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between House committee membership and campaign contributions from financial services industry political action committees (PACs) over the 1998–2002 election periods. Three significant pieces of banking legislation were passed during this time. Because members of the financial services industry were affected greatly by this legislation, it seems logical that PACs might attempt to influence the legislative process through the distribution of campaign contributions. We examine the relationship between PAC contributions to individual legislators for the 1998–2002 election cycle and membership on the House banking committee using a sample selection model. We find committee membership matters and the different financial services industry PACs give disproportionately more to representatives with the power to write legislation favorable to the industry.
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