Abstract
We study a conflict of two individuals over a valuable resource. We construct a sequential game where the first individual, the Owner, decides whether to defend the resource and the other individual, the Intruder, decides whether to attack and try to steal the resource. Individuals know the value of the resource to themselves. This provides the individuals an estimate of the value of the resource to the opponent. We build a mathematical model that allows us to quantify and vary the accuracy of this estimate. We study how the outcomes of the game depend on the accuracy. We show that, in our setting, the accuracy does not matter to the Intruder but it does to the Owner. For resources of a large value, the Owner benefits from a smaller accuracy. However, for resources of a small value, the Owner benefits from a bigger accuracy.
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