OVER DE RELEVANTIE VAN DE GESCHIEDENIS VAN DE WETEN-SCHAPPEN VOOR DE FILOSOFIE VAN DE WETENSCHAPPEN

Abstract

SUMMARY It is a current idea that, in contrast with Continental philosophers, so-called analytical philosophers till 1960 attached no importance to history and could muster hardly any interest in it. As a factual claim this is just about right. As a claim about their implicit commitments it is incorrect. I argue that due to their idea of a rational reconstruction according to which the advanced sciences function as a criterion of rationality, both the Logical Positivists and the Popperians were committed to the relevance of the history of science. Because of this implicit commitment Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) could have the extra—ordinary impact it had. In reaction to Kuhn both the Post—positivistic realist (Putnam) and the new Popperians (Lakatos) have tried to make the best out of the situation by giving explicit prominence to the history of science: this history was to be an important judge of their philosophy of science. Though the history was to be a judge, not everything in th...