Abstract

International relations scholars have long debated the usefulness of two main competing models of the foreign policy decision making process, the rational and the psychological. However, there have been few efforts at direct empirical testing in historical cases, largely because both models are so underpredictive that the question has been thought methodologically intractable. In consequence, most work in the field has relied on one or the other of these models, usually ignoring the other. This pessimism is misplaced; although certain hurdles must be overcome, successful competitive testing of decision making theories is possible. This article constructs a method capable of distinguishing the two models in historical cases, and uses it to test for psychological effects on German foreign policy decision making in the Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906. The findings in this case support the psychological theories, although much wider testing is needed to establish the relative validity of the competing approaches.

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