Abstract

Drawing upon empirical evidence this article explains that, as the US-China Great Power Competition intensifies, New Zealand – a small state in the South Pacific – has shifted its view of Beijing from a potential security partner to a revisionist actor challenging the regional status quo and the international rules-based order that Wellington repeatedly declares is critical to its long-term security. China’s rise and assertive behaviour is placing structural pressure on New Zealand to react and altered its threat assessment of Beijing. This article reveals this by detailing New Zealand’s balancing strategy in the security domain vis-a-vis China from 2010. This includes an initial phase of pre-balancing through deepened ties with Washington, then transition to active balancing via acquisition of advanced aircraft, space co-operation, joint naval manoeuvres, and initiatives in the Pacific. A suite of new strategy documents released by the New Zealand government in August 2023 - and statements made by the new conservative National Party-led coalition government in 2024 - signals that balancing is set to continue and portends the rejuvenation of the NZ Defence Force (which has been neglected and under-resourced in recent times). New Zealand’s potential membership of Pillar 2 of the AUKUS security pact is considered, and how Wellington is presently managing its relationships with the US and China within a broader asymmetric hedging strategy. The article concludes that if China’s behaviour demonstrably changes, so too may Wellington’s assessment of the China threat and, therefore, Wellington’s response. It also outlines area where additional research could prove fruitful.

Full Text
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