Ordnung und Abweichung. Jurij M. Lotmans Grenzüberschreitungstheorie aus modallogischer Perspektive

Abstract

AbstractIn the 1970s and 1980s, literary theorists, particularly in the German-speaking world, showed increasing interest in appropriating the distinctive methodologies of both the positivist social sciences and the natural sciences. Alongside empirical (e. g. Groeben 1982) and analytical approaches to literature (e. g. Fink/Schmidt 1984), the structuralist school shaped by Lotman’s narrative theory attempted a scientific turn in literary theory (cf. Köppe/Winko 2010), aiming for an exact science, or at least one more exact than the traditional ›art of interpretation‹ admitted by Staiger (1955). We trace the structuralist approach, or more precisely, the central aspect of structuralist narratology, the theory of boundary-crossing, first in Lotman (1979), and then criticise Renner’s remodelling based on formal logic (1983), and finally remodel boundary-crossing theory by means of modal logic. By doing this, we hope to demonstrate the potential of a methodologically self-aware, terminologically precise text analysis that is therefore capable of intersubjectivity.At the beginning of the 1970s, the Estonian literary scholar and cultural semiotician Jurij M. Lotman took as his starting point the strong human affinity for the replication of abstract systems (The most influential formulation of Lotman’s boundary-crossing theory – at least in the German speaking world – was that of Karl N. Renner in the early 1980s. Renner understood events to be disruptions of order, and disruptions of order in turn as logical contradictions. In addition to the formal logic representation of disruptions of order, Lotman and Renner differ in that Renner presupposes that the ›eventful situation‹ arisesThe consequences of the principle of non-contradiction do not occur to Renner. While Renner is, in fact, dissatisfied with his model, for him the problem lies in a different circumstance: his ordering statements lack the characteristics of postulates. It can be deduced from his writings that he wishes his ordering statements to be understood as normative statements. However, non-modal sentences, and these are precisely what Renner uses, do not describe, even in the case of subjunctions/implications, what should be, but merely whatThis problem, addressed but not explored by Renner, can be solved with the help of normative reasoning/deontic modal logic. Instead of an operator of necessity, here an operator of obligation is used. Using this operator, we can produce contradiction-free statements about how something should be, which can be placed in relation to selective statements about how things are. Our aim, however, is not exclusively or primarily to criticise Renner, but rather to develop the particular benefits which these consideration of formal logic bring to cross-boundary theory – namely the connection between the quality of the ordering statements, and the durative and non-durative aspect of events.We demonstrate this using Pierre Boulles’ 1963 novel