Ordinary Language Philosophy

Abstract

‘Ordinary language philosophy’ is the name given, usually by critics, to two related approaches to philosophy, deriving from Austin and Wittgenstein, after the Second World War. Austin's version, associated with Oxford, reflected the conviction that the categories embedded in ordinary language are worth elucidating, and also the view that philosophers often misuse ordinary language. The latter conviction informs Austin's famous discussion of perception in Sense and sensibilia. Austin, however, did not think that traditional philosophical problems had to rest on misuse, and moreover, his own criticisms did not distinguish between misuse and novel use. This meant that his advice about focusing on ordinary language came to seem to have no real philosophical motivation. Wittgenstein held that traditional philosophy concerned pseudo-questions, from which we can break free by proper philosophical therapy, in the course of which the linguistic misuses which propel us into taking the questions seriously are laid bare by reminding ourselves as to what we would actually say. Hence a part of philosophy should be reminders about ordinary language. The problem with this view is that Wittgenstein provides no reason to accept his account of traditional philosophy, and moreover, he appears himself to engage in advancing positive answers to some traditional philosophical problems. On the whole, then, for most philosophers, Wittgenstein's attitude to philosophy is an implausible and detachable part of his thought, the value of which lies elsewhere. It is important to realize that the philosophical practice of both Austin and Wittgenstein is far more significant than their views about philosophy itself, and calling them ‘ordinary language philosophers’ completely fails to convey the richness of their thought. The lasting significance of the recommendations of ordinary language philosophy probably lies in the development, by Grice and others, of a theory of speech which undercuts the relevance to truth of asking ‘Would we say that?’, thereby making its philosophical relevance highly dubious, but which has considerably illuminated ordinary speech.