Abstract
Cap-and-trade is widely recognized as an effective mechanism for curbing carbon emissions, and it significantly influences the operational decisions within supply chains. This study investigates a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of one original equipment manufacturer, one traditional retailer, and one independent third-party collector. The manufacturer invests in cleaner technologies to produce green products and remanufactures new products from used items recycled by the third-party collector. Considering different channel power structures, three Stackelberg game models are developed, and their optimal solutions are derived using the backward induction. Additionally, the combined effects of remanufacturing-related and carbon-related parameters on economic and environmental benefits as well as social welfare are investigated under different settings. Moreover, the derived results are validated via numerical simulation. The findings indicate that: (1) Each channel member is incentivized to act as the leader role within the CLSC to maximize profits. (2) A loose cap-and-trade regulation is conducive to enhancing the emission abatement rate, collection rate, and overall performance for the CLSC. (3) The retailer-led model is the best option for capturing more economic benefits and social welfare, while the third party-led model can always achieve the best environmental performance regardless of carbon trading price. These research findings can provide valuable insights for policymakers and decision makers engaged in CLSC.
Published Version
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